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A MORE EMPLOYEE-FRIENDLY
STANDARD FOR PRETEXT CLAIMS
AFTER ASH V. TYSON
Deanna C. Brinkerhoff *
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent Gallup Poll reported that fifteen percent of American workers
claim their employers discriminated against them during a one-year period
spanning from 2004 to 2005.1  The most frequent type of discrimination
occurred in promotion decisions, which comprised thirty-three percent of the
total reported incidents.2  Employment discrimination cases are also the largest
single category of federal civil cases, comprising nearly ten percent of the total
federal civil docket.3  Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in
1964 to combat employment discrimination and to make the victims of discrim-
ination whole through compensation.4  The Supreme Court has recognized that
employment discrimination cases implicate personal and societal interests by
promoting “efficient and trustworthy workmanship . . . through fair and . . .
neutral employment and personnel decisions.”5  The Court has also recognized
that Title VII furthers these interests by helping to eliminate the vestiges of this
country’s history of discrimination.6  Under Title VII, employers are not under
any obligation to make perfect decisions or to make decisions with which
others agree.7  Nor are they required to give women or minorities preferential
treatment.8  Rather, an employer is free to choose among all qualified appli-
cants so long as it does not base its decision on unlawful discriminatory
criteria.9
* William S. Boyd School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2008.  This Note won the Nevada
Law Journal’s 2007 Carl W. Tobias Excellence in Writing Award.
1 Amy Joyce, The Bias Breakdown:  Asians and Blacks Lead in Perceived Discrimination at
Work, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2005, at D1.
2 Id. at D3.  According to the Gallup Poll, pay discrimination was the next most common
form of discrimination, comprising twenty-nine percent of the total reported incidents.  The
Poll also reported that employers are most likely to discriminate based on sex (twenty-six
percent), followed by race (twenty-three percent), and age (seventeen percent). Id.
3 Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004).
4 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
5 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
6 Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 418.
7 Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 1996).
8 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981).
9 Id.
474
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ119.txt unknown Seq: 2 17-JAN-08 10:28
Fall 2007] PRETEXT CLAIMS 475
A plaintiff may attempt to prove his employer engaged in unlawful dis-
crimination in a promotion decision by showing that his employer’s articulated
reasons for not promoting the plaintiff were pretextual.  The plaintiff may use a
number of methods to achieve this goal, including presenting evidence that the
plaintiff had superior qualifications for the position or presenting evidence of
the employer’s past treatment of the plaintiff, such as past instances of discrim-
ination.10  Plaintiffs are not limited to these methods of proof and are not
required to demonstrate they were more qualified than the individuals chosen,
so long as they show they met the minimum qualifications for the position at
issue.11  However, federal courts have held plaintiffs to differing standards in
pretext cases founded on superior qualifications, and the Supreme Court has
declined to articulate precisely what standard should govern these claims.12
This Note will utilize the recent United States Supreme Court case, Ash v.
Tyson Foods, Inc., to develop a precise standard for courts to use in dealing
with pretext claims based in failure to promote cases.  Part II will discuss the
development of employment discrimination law in the context of failure to pro-
mote cases.  Part III will outline the facts, holdings, and rationales used and
rejected by the Supreme Court in Ash.  Part IV will discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of the various standards of proof that the circuit courts have
required plaintiffs to satisfy.  Finally, Part IV will suggest a standard for plain-
tiffs to prove pretext in failure to promote cases and explain why a uniform
standard is so critical.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LAW REGARDING
FAILURE TO PROMOTE CLAIMS
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer to
“fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”13  This statute prohibits discrimination based on any of
the enumerated characteristics in any employment decision.14  In 1973, the
Supreme Court articulated a burden-shifting process that an employee plaintiff
could use when lacking direct evidence of discrimination by an employer.15
However, since that time, the Court has handed down several decisions making
it more difficult for employee plaintiffs to prove their case, particularly in situa-
tions where a plaintiff alleges that his employer’s articulated reasons for an
adverse employment action were pretextual.16
10 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1989), superseded on other
grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2), 105 Stat. 1071,
1071-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
11 Id. at 186.
12 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457-58 (2006) (per curiam).
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
14 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 (1973).
15 Id. at 802-04.
16 See infra Part II.B-C.
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A. The McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting Process
To succeed on his claim of individual disparate treatment, a plaintiff must
prove his employer acted with a discriminatory intent.17  A plaintiff who is
unable to provide direct evidence of discrimination by the employer may use
the burden-shifting approach set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.18  Under this approach, a plaintiff may establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination in a failure to promote case by
showing that he (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified and
applied for a promotion; (3) was rejected for the promotion; and (4) the posi-
tion remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with the
same qualifications as the plaintiff.19  A court will only require a plaintiff to
make a minimal showing at this stage in the proceedings.20
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, he creates a
presumption of discrimination, and the burden shifts to the employer to produce
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote decision.21  If
the employer succeeds in providing a nondiscriminatory reason, it rebuts the
presumption of discrimination and the burden shifts once again to the
plaintiff.22
The plaintiff must then show that a discriminatory reason at least partially
motivated the employer’s decision23 or that the employer’s articulated nondis-
criminatory reason was pretextual.24  Courts should then focus on whether dis-
crimination is inferable from a combination of the plaintiff’s prima facie case,
the plaintiff’s evidence attacking the employer’s claimed reasons for the deci-
sion, any other evidence provided by the plaintiff, and any contrary evidence
provided by the employer.25  The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion
throughout the burden-shifting process.26
B. The Plaintiff’s Difficult Task of Proving Pretext
Although McDonnell Douglas was a Title VII case involving an
employer’s failure to rehire,27 courts have adapted its framework to fit different
17 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
18 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
19 Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385 F.3d 210, 226 (2d Cir. 2004); see also McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802.  Some courts have an additional fifth element—that the employer promoted
equally or less qualified applicants not belonging to the protected group instead of the plain-
tiff.  Eddie Kirtley, Comment, Where’s Einstein When You Need Him?  Assessing the Role of
Relative Qualifications in a Plaintiff’s Case of Failure-to-Promote Under Title VII, 60 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 365, 368 & n.13 (2006) (citing Perryman v. Johnson Prods. Co., 698 F.2d
1138, 1142 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983)).
20 Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2000).
21 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
22 Gonzalez v. City of New York, 354 F. Supp. 2d 327, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); see, e.g., Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424
F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2005); Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011, 1019
(8th Cir. 2005); Roberson v. Alltel Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 2004); Bellaver
v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 2000).
24 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 798.
25 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
26 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
27 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796.
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types of disparate treatment claims, including failure to promote,28 unlawful
discharge,29 retaliation,30 harassment,31 and even claims under different stat-
utes.32  The purpose of the prima facie case is to force employers to produce
evidence of nondiscriminatory reasons for their employment decisions because
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare and difficult for plaintiffs to
obtain.33  Indeed, laws against employment discrimination would be virtually
useless if courts required plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discrimina-
tion.34  Often, the evidence needed by the plaintiff is proof of what occurred in
the mental processes of the employer’s decisionmaker, of which there will be
no direct evidence.35  Consequently, Title VII plaintiffs must usually rely on
circumstantial evidence to satisfy their burden of persuasion.36  Courts should
be hesitant to resolve an employment discrimination case at the summary judg-
ment stage because an employer’s intent is typically in dispute.37  Thus, it is
more appropriate for these types of cases to be decided after the factfinder has
had the opportunity to hear all the evidence and assess the credibility of each
side.
However, the fact that an employer’s stated reason for an employment
decision was false does not always lead to the conclusion that the employer
acted discriminatorily.38  An employer may offer false reasons for its decision
to cover up an embarrassing, but legal, motive or to help motivate an unsatis-
28 Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 710 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff was
required to allege that she had applied for a specific position in order to establish a prima
facie case for a failure to promote claim).
29 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 509 (2002) (finding that plaintiff who
alleged he had been terminated due to his national origin and his age, and who detailed the
events surrounding his termination and included the ages and nationalities of the individuals
involved in his termination, stated a cause of action under both Title VII and the ADEA,
even though his complaint failed to allege facts constituting a prima facie case).
30 Johnson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying McDonnell
Douglas framework where the plaintiff alleged he had been fired in retaliation for defending
his employer’s affirmative action policy).
31 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185-87 (1989) (applying McDonnell
Douglas framework where the plaintiff claimed that her employer had harassed, failed to
promote, and discharged her because of her race), superseded on other grounds by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
32 Courts have also applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2000). See, e.g., Byrnie
v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2001).  It has been applied to
racial discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well. See, e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S.
at 186.
33 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989,
993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumb-
ing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
34 Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 507 (3d Cir. 1996).
35 U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
36 Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993.
37 Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
38 Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1337-38 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other
grounds by Reeves, 530 U.S. 133.
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factory employee to improve his performance.39  The factfinder may conclude
that a reason left unarticulated by the employer was the true reason behind the
employment decision, even though the plaintiff did not have an opportunity to
rebut the reason due to the employer’s failure to articulate it during the earlier
proceedings.40  However, because the employer is in the best position to give
the true reason for its decision, a factfinder is entitled, though not required, to
find that an employer’s articulation of false reasons is actually a cover up for a
discriminatory motive.41  This is consistent with the general evidentiary princi-
ple that when a party is dishonest about a material fact, the factfinder may take
it as affirmative evidence of the party’s guilt.42
Because an employer defending against a claim of discrimination is facing
potentially large compensatory and punitive damage payouts, some commenta-
tors have expressed concern that employers will nearly always produce a non-
discriminatory reason for their decision, even if it was not the actual
motivation.43  Furthermore, because the employer is only required to produce
an explanation of a nondiscriminatory purpose behind its decision and is not
required to produce evidence of the reason for its actions, the burden on
employers is so light that they will almost always prevail unless they remain
silent.44  Justice Souter has criticized this effect of the current law on employ-
ers, pointing out that it allows employers who are “caught in a lie” to win by
asserting a previously unarticulated nondiscriminatory reason for their decision
at trial and, thus, gain a reward for their dishonesty.45
C. Supreme Court Precedent Regarding Pretext Claims
In 1986, the Supreme Court handed down three decisions that indicated it
would hold plaintiffs to a higher standard of proof than it had previously.46  In
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,47 Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,48 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,49 the Court heightened the standard
39 See Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination
Litigation: St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Personality” Excuse, 18
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 201 (1997).
40 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 (1993).
41 Olsen v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 267 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2001).
42 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992) (plurality opinion).
43 See Alex Long, The Disconnect Between At-Will Employment and Tortious Interference
with Business Relations:  Rethinking Tortious Interference Claims in the Employment Con-
text, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 491, 520 (2001); Brent L. Ryman, Comment, Lame Duck Precedent:
A Comment on the Summary Judgment Framework for Disparate Treatment Cases After
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 669, 689 (2002).
44 Stefanie Vines Efrati, Note, Between Pretext Plus and Pretext Only:  Shouldering the
Effects of Pretext on Employment Discrimination After St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks
and Fisher v. Vassar College, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 153, 162-63 (1999) (discussing the
defendant’s burden of proof in employment discrimination cases as set out in Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981)).
45 St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 540 n.13, 543 (Souter, J., dissenting).
46 Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy:  The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206 (1993).
47 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
48 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
49 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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employee plaintiffs would have to satisfy in order to avoid summary judgment
in favor of the defendant employer, thus indicating a trend towards a more
defendant-friendly standard.50  Lower courts began to grant summary judgment
in favor of defendants more often in cases where plaintiffs had claims that
appeared weak or potentially unsuccessful, even when there were still questions
of fact regarding the employer’s motive that should have been resolved at
trial.51  The Supreme Court’s 1989 decision in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union52 compounded the problems employee plaintiffs faced.  There, the Court
announced that plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination by their employer could
not seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,53 a statute under which many Title
VII plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination sue as well.
In response to these cases, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which clarified that civil rights plaintiffs have a right to demand a jury trial and
explicitly stated that employment discrimination plaintiffs could sue for com-
pensatory and punitive damage awards.54  Congress passed the Act “to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”55  Commentators hailed the
new Act, believing it manifested Congress’s intent to make litigation easier for
employment discrimination plaintiffs because the practical effects of the Act
were to increase financial awards for plaintiffs, make litigation cost control
more difficult for employers, and make employment discrimination trials more
difficult for employers to win.56
The Supreme Court has not required evidence of relative qualifications for
a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote.57
Because employers make promotion decisions using many criteria and an
employee may not know which criteria were most important to the employer, it
is difficult for plaintiffs to show they are more qualified than the individual
chosen.58  Employer explanations for hiring or promotion decisions that are
based on subjective considerations deserve closer scrutiny than decisions based
on objective considerations because the individual selected for hire or promo-
tion will usually be superior to the plaintiff in at least one subjective criterion.59
50 McGinley, supra note 46, at 207.
51 Id. at 208.
52 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded on other grounds by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
53 Id. at 188-89.
54 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072-73 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000)); see also Tracy L. Bach, Note, Gender Stereotyping in
Employment Discrimination:  Finding a Balance of Evidence and Causation Under Title
VII, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1251, 1267 n.75 (1993) (discussing the various effects of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
55 Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 250 (1994).
56 Thomas J. Piskorski & Michael A. Warner, The Civil Rights Act of 1991:  Overview and
Analysis, 8 LAB. LAW. 9, 17 (1992).
57 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981).
58 Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity,
85 MINN. L. REV. 587, 645 (2000).
59 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding
that summary judgment to employer was error where employer claimed that plaintiff was not
chosen for a position because he failed to display enthusiasm for the job but was signifi-
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This allows employers to simply point to this criterion and claim they chose
someone else over the plaintiff because that person was superior in one particu-
lar area, even though that area may not have been that important to the
employer.60
Accordingly, a plaintiff is not required to prove he was better qualified
than the individual actually chosen for the promotion in order to prevail.61
Rather, a plaintiff may prove that an employer’s reasons for hiring another
individual instead of the plaintiff were pretextual by presenting evidence of the
employer’s previous treatment of the plaintiff, company policy and practice,
statistical data regarding minority employment, procedural abnormalities that
indicate manipulation of hiring criteria, or the employer’s use of subjective
criteria in the hiring decision.62  It is not easy for a plaintiff to prove that his
employer’s stated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons are false.63  The
employer will presumably tailor the reasons it gives to fit the circumstances of
the particular case, and the employer’s legal counsel will vigorously defend
those reasons.64  Even when discrimination by the employer has occurred, the
employer will often combine it with bad management or generally poor treat-
ment of employees that although unwise, is not illegal.65
Thus, it follows that when a plaintiff successfully discredits her
employer’s proffered reason for its failure to promote decision, this is deserving
of considerable weight.66  Such a showing does not compel judgment for the
plaintiff,67 although at least one commentator believes that it should always
defeat a directed verdict against the plaintiff and generally should produce a
verdict for the plaintiff.68  In situations where an employer has an established
record of equal opportunity employment, the discriminatory inference arising
cantly more qualified than the individual chosen for the position); see also Fischbach v. D.C.
Dep’t of Corr., 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that an interviewing panel’s
claim that it preferred one applicant’s answers to another applicant’s answers was insuffi-
cient to indicate that it was a pretext for racial discrimination).
60 Kirtley, supra note 19, at 387.
61 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1989), superseded on other
grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2), 105 Stat. 1071,
1071-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
62 Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
63 Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Discrimination, Plain and Simple, 36 TULSA L.J. 557, 573
(2001).
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 1992) (opining that Title
VII does not prohibit unexplained differences in treatment of employees even if those deci-
sions are inconsistent or irrational); DeLuca v. Allied Domecq Quick Serv. Rests., No. 03-
CV-5142, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39261, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2006) (stating that an
employer may subject an employee to an adverse employment action “for a good reason, a
bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is
not for a discriminatory reason”); Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1201,
1214-15 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (finding that imposing conditions on an African American candi-
date’s promotion while failing to subject Caucasian candidates to the same conditions was
unwise, but not sufficient to support a Title VII claim against the employer because the
additional conditions were related to the candidate’s job performance).
66 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
67 Id.
68 Chambers, supra note 63, at 573.
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from the discrediting of the employer’s stated explanation may not always be
strong enough to lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude discrimination has
occurred.69
Some courts may use their power to assign the burdens of production and
persuasion to the parties in ways that favor a particular, desired outcome when
they do not agree with the substantive theory of liability chosen by the plaintiff
in the case.70  This may result in a just outcome in a particular case, but more
often, the effect is confusing language regarding the standard of proof and
strained logic in judicial opinions.71  With courts holding employment discrim-
ination plaintiffs to so many different standards in pretext cases, the question
arose of what the proper standard was.  In Ash v. Tyson, the Supreme Court
addressed this question but did not answer it.
III. ASH V. TYSON
In Ash v. Tyson, two male African American superintendents at a poultry
plant applied for promotions to shift manager positions.72  Their employer,
Tyson Foods, promoted two Caucasian males for the positions instead.73  The
two African American men sued Tyson, claiming they were better qualified for
the positions than the Caucasian men who received the promotions were and
alleging racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42
U.S.C. § 1981.74
The plaintiffs claimed that Tyson’s reasons for not promoting them were
pretextual for eight reasons.  First, the company’s answers as to why it did not
promote the plaintiffs changed over time.75  Second, management used qualifi-
cations not required by company policy to keep the plaintiffs from receiving the
promotions.76  Third, the company only checked references for African Ameri-
can applicants.77  Fourth, the company lied about a college degree requirement
for the positions.78  Fifth, the company offered the promotion to a Caucasian
man before interviewing the second plaintiff.79  Sixth, the company’s manage-
ment handpicked a Caucasian man for the shift manager position after telling
the plaintiffs that Tyson would hold the position open before making a promo-
69 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citing an
example given in St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 513, of a situation where a hiring officer and forty
percent of the workforce are members of the plaintiff’s minority group but that group makes
up only ten percent of the labor market, and opining that in such a situation, any inference
resulting from the plaintiff’s discrediting of the employer’s stated reasons for its decision
will be weak).
70 Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:  Toward a The-
ory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1209-10 (1981).
71 Id. at 1210.
72 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006) (per curiam).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 531 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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tion decision.80  Seventh, there was no proof that the plant was losing money
while the plaintiffs were superintendents there, despite the company’s claims to
the contrary.81  The final reason was that management made the decision in an
atmosphere where they treated African Americans differently.82  This unequal
treatment included exhibiting a cold demeanor towards the plaintiffs and refer-
ring to them as “boys.”83
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held
a jury trial on the matter.84  At trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence of a
Tyson job summary that listed three to five years experience among the
requirements for the shift manager position.85  One of the Caucasian men pro-
moted to shift manager instead of the plaintiffs had worked for Tyson for less
than two years.86  The plaintiffs also introduced evidence of Tyson’s personnel
policy, which stated that employees within the department should receive pro-
motions created by vacancies whenever possible.87  Both plaintiffs applied for
promotions within their department, but one of the Caucasian men promoted
did not even work in the same complex of the plant.88  The plaintiffs also
presented evidence of another Tyson personnel policy, which stated that pro-
motion was one of the rights and benefits that came with established seniority
within the company.89  One plaintiff had worked at the Tyson plant for thirteen
years and the other for fifteen years, while the Caucasian man who got the
promotion had worked at the plant for less than two years.90  Tyson moved for
judgment as a matter of law at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, which the
district court denied.91
Tyson then offered evidence that the man responsible for making the pro-
motion decisions was unaware of the company’s promotion policies and, alter-
natively, that the policies were merely suggestions, so their strict enforcement
was not required.92  Tyson also offered evidence that one of the main criteria
for promotion was the applicant’s employment somewhere other than at that
particular plant, claiming that management was looking for a new perspective
because the plant was losing money and in danger of closing.93  The plaintiffs
claimed that these criteria were pretextual and that Tyson articulated these rea-
sons to avoid liability.94  The plaintiffs offered evidence that the plant was not
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.  The Supreme Court held that the use of the word “boy” in reference to the plaintiffs
could be evidence of the employer’s discriminatory intent.  Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546
U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam).
84 Ash, 546 U.S. at 455.
85 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ash, 546 U.S. 454 (No. 05-379), 2005 WL 2341981, at *5.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006) (per curiam).
92 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *6.
93 Id.
94 Id. at *6-7.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ119.txt unknown Seq: 10 17-JAN-08 10:28
Fall 2007] PRETEXT CLAIMS 483
losing money and that one of the Caucasian men Tyson promoted came from a
plant Tyson had in fact closed for lack of profits.95
The judge instructed the jury that it could not find Tyson liable for making
“stupid” promotion decisions and that it could only find Tyson liable if the
decisions were racially discriminatory.96  A racially mixed jury found Tyson
engaged in discrimination against both plaintiffs and awarded each of them
$250,000 in compensatory damages and $1,500,000 in punitive damages.97
However, after the jury returned the verdict, the District Court granted Tyson’s
renewed motion for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part.99  The court of appeals affirmed as to one plaintiff,
finding that he failed to present sufficient evidence to show pretext and thus
could not show unlawful discrimination by Tyson under the McDonnell Doug-
las burden-shifting framework.100  The Eleventh Circuit reversed as to the sec-
ond plaintiff, however, finding he presented sufficient evidence that Tyson’s
reasons for not promoting him were pretextual.101  The evidence consisted of
statements that Tyson did not promote him because he had no college degree,
he lacked experience outside of that particular plant, and the plant where he
was currently a superintendent was suffering financial losses.102  The second
plaintiff, however, presented evidence that a Tyson official interviewed him
after Tyson had already hired a Caucasian man for the position, thus showing
that Tyson’s stated reasons were pretextual because they had already hired
someone else.103  The court stated that an employer would only be entitled to
judgment as a matter of law where the employee presented a weak issue of fact
regarding whether the employer’s stated reason was false and there was “abun-
dant and uncontroverted independent evidence” that discrimination had not
occurred.104  The court further articulated its standard by stating that “[p]retext
can be established through comparing qualifications only when ‘the disparity in
qualifications is so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap you in
the face.’”105
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed in part, finding that
the plaintiffs’ evidence of superior qualifications could show that Tyson’s
articulated reasons for its failure to promote decision were pretextual as to both
95 Id.
96 Id. at *7.
97 Id. at *3.
98 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 455 (2006) (per curiam).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 534 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 532.
105 Id. at 533.  This standard came from a prior case, Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695,
732 (11th Cir. 2004).  The Fifth Circuit has sometimes used this standard as well. See
Deines v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280-82 (5th Cir.
1999); EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1445 (5th Cir. 1995); Odom v.
Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 847 (5th Cir. 1993).  The First and Tenth Circuits have also used it on
occasion. See Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam); Lehman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 74 F.3d 323, 329 (1st Cir. 1996).
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plaintiffs.106  The Court held that the Eleventh Circuit’s “slap you in the face”
pretext standard was “unhelpful and imprecise.”107  The Court then listed sev-
eral other standards used by different federal courts.108  This included another
decision by the Eleventh Circuit, which stated that qualification disparities
“must be of such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the
exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over
the plaintiff.”109  The Court also cited the Ninth Circuit, which held that quali-
fications evidence by itself may show pretext when the plaintiff’s qualifications
are “clearly superior” to those of the individual chosen for the promotion.110
The Court then cited the District of Columbia Circuit, which held that a
factfinder might infer pretext if a “reasonable employer would have found the
plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job.”111
In addition, the Court cited some of its own previous decisions to show
that evidence of superior qualifications alone may be enough to show pretext in
some situations.112  In a 1989 decision, the Court indicated a plaintiff could
seek to demonstrate his employer’s claim to have promoted a more qualified
individual was pretextual by demonstrating that the plaintiff was in fact more
qualified than the individual chosen.113  In a more recent decision from 2000,
the Court held that an employee’s prima facie case, together with adequate
evidence to find the employer’s claimed justification is untrue, may allow the
factfinder to conclude that the employer engaged in discrimination.114
Ultimately, the Court in Ash declined to give a precise definition of what
standard courts should follow in pretext cases based on superior qualifica-
tions.115  The Court failed to explain why the case did not merit a statement of
what the proper standard should be, nor did it explain why the standard used by
the Eleventh Circuit led to imprecise results, thus leading to further confusion,
rather than clarifying the state of the law.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ASH STANDARD AND A PROPOSED NEW STANDARD
Because the Supreme Court declined to define what standard courts should
use in pretext cases based on superior qualifications, a question remains as to
what the correct standard should be.  The Court was correct in overruling the
Ash standard because it had numerous flaws, many of which were not noted by
the Court.  Many of the standards used by other federal courts share the same or
106 Ash, 546 U.S. at 456.
107 Id. at 457.
108 Id. at 457-58.
109 Id. at 457 (quoting Cooper, 390 F.3d at 732).
110 Id. at 457-58 (quoting Raad v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185,
1194 (9th Cir. 2003)).
111 Id. at 458 (quoting Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en
banc)).
112 Id. at 457.
113 Id. (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187-88 (1989), superseded
on other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2), 105
Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000))).
114 Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)).
115 Id. at 458.
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similar flaws.  Thus, a new standard is needed that eliminates the problems
inherent in many of the current standards and ensures employee plaintiffs the
opportunity to litigate their claims on a level playing field with their employer.
A. Criticisms of the Ash v. Tyson Standard
The Supreme Court criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s standard in Ash as
being “unhelpful and imprecise.”116  This is an accurate criticism because the
standard is so subjective.  Standards based on metaphors, such as a slap in the
face, may be more memorable than other standards, but they offer little real
guidance to the factfinder and carry with them the added problem that each
factfinder will understand a metaphor differently, thus increasing the chances
of discrepancies among courts applying the same standard.  Indeed, Judge Car-
dozo stated that metaphors must “be narrowly watched, for starting out as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.”117  The Court fur-
ther criticized the Eleventh Circuit’s standard, opining that some other standard
would ensure more uniform results among the different courts.118  However,
since Ash, district courts have been widely inconsistent with their rulings,119
perhaps because the Court declined to articulate a precise standard for trial
courts to apply, leaving them to choose from among those standards not explic-
itly rejected by the Court or to fashion new ones.120
Another flaw with the Eleventh Circuit’s standard, not noted by the
Supreme Court, is that it is close to impossible for most plaintiffs to achieve,
thus disposing of many potentially meritorious cases prematurely.  This stan-
dard seems closer to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal
trials than to the preponderance of the evidence standard properly used in civil
cases.  Courts define preponderance of the evidence as
[t]he greater weight of the evidence . . . that, though not sufficient to free the mind
wholly from reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to
one side of the issue . . . .  [T]he jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the
whole, has the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be.121
While civil cases involve very important personal rights, the judicial sys-
tem’s concern that it might mistakenly hold a defendant liable is not as great as
the corresponding concern in a criminal case.  Courts should reflect this policy
judgment by utilizing a lower burden of proof in civil cases.122  In civil dis-
putes, the plaintiff and defendant should share the risk of an incorrect decision
in a “roughly equal fashion.”123  Judges have interpreted this standard to mean
116 Id. at 457.
117 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
118 Ash, 546 U.S. at 458.
119 See infra Part IV.B.
120 Debra S. Katz & Lisa J. Banks, Victories for Workers, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 2, 2006, at 10,
10.
121 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
122 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing the
policy reasons behind requiring a higher burden of proof in criminal cases than in civil
cases).
123 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423
(1979).
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the factfinder need only conclude the plaintiff’s claim is more than fifty percent
likely to return a verdict for the plaintiff.124
A reasonable doubt, on the other hand, is “[t]he doubt that prevents one
from being firmly convinced of a defendant’s guilt”125 and which leaves the
mind of the judge or jury in a condition where they feel “an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.”126  Some states have defined
reasonable doubt in their criminal trial jury instructions as “not mere possible
doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral
evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt,” but rather “an actual
and substantial doubt reasonably arising from the evidence, from the facts or
circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the lack of evidence on the part
of the State, as distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, from
bare imagination, or from fanciful conjecture.”127  Other criminal courts have
instructed juries that if “you are not firmly convinced of [the] defendant’s guilt,
you must give [the] defendant the benefit of the doubt and find him not
guilty.”128  Judges have concluded that proof beyond a reasonable doubt means
that the factfinder must find a material disputed fact to be at least ninety to
ninety-five percent likely.129
An analysis of the standard used in Ash, as well as those used in many
other pretext cases, shows that these standards are much closer to the criminal
beyond a reasonable doubt standard than they are to the appropriate preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.  Courts should not require plaintiffs to meet such
a high evidentiary burden in a civil matter.  A standard that directs the
factfinder that the evidence must slap them in the face requires a much greater
quantum of proof than that appropriate for civil cases.  Indeed, when applying
the “slap you in the face” standard, the Eleventh Circuit has never found a
plaintiff’s evidence sufficient to meet that burden.130  The Eleventh Circuit has
124 C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof:  Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Consti-
tutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1303 (1982); R. J. Simon, Judges’ Transla-
tions of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Probability, 13 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 103, 103-14
(1969); Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision
and Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
769, 774 (2000) (citing United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff’d, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979)).
125 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 121, at 1293.
126 Id. at 1294 (citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 320 (1850)).
127 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 8, 18 (1994) (upholding these instructions in a Nebraska
case).  Courts have used instructions that closely mirror this one in other jurisdictions as
well. See, e.g., Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1125 (10th Cir. 2000); Ramirez v. Hatcher,
136 F.3d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. State, 967 P.2d 98, 101 (Alaska Ct. App.
1998).
128 State v. Medina, 685 A.2d 1242, 1252 (N.J. 1996); see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 27
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that jurors in criminal cases should be instructed that the
prosecution must prove its case by something more than a preponderance of the evidence but
not to an absolute certainty); United States v. Hessman, 493 F.3d 977, 983 (8th Cir. 2007)
(upholding jury instruction that “if, after a full and fair consideration of all the evidence or
lack of evidence produced by the State you are not firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt,
then you have a reasonable doubt and you should find the defendant not guilty”).
129 Stoffelmayr & Diamond, supra note 124, at 774.
130 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *8; see, e.g., Goodman v. Ga. Sw., 147
F. App’x 888, 892-93 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Stuart v. Jefferson County Dep’t of
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used this standard to grant summary judgment for defendants131 and to overturn
jury verdicts for plaintiffs.132  At least thirty-four district court decisions within
the Eleventh Circuit have applied this standard, and not once has the plaintiff
been able to meet this stringent burden.133
B. Standards Used by Other Courts
Commentators have opined that the federal courts’ failure to articulate a
coherent framework for assigning the burdens of proof in employment discrim-
ination cases is a major problem in enforcing employment discrimination
laws.134  This disparity among the federal courts is especially striking in the
area of pretext claims.  The different circuits have required plaintiffs in these
cases to meet standards with varying degrees of difficulty.  In Ash, the Supreme
Court mentioned several standards used by different federal courts but declined
to adopt any of them.135  Thus, one can infer that the Court did not consider
any of these standards proper.  This subsection will discuss the standards noted
by the Court in Ash and the strengths and weaknesses of each, as well as sev-
eral other standards not mentioned by the Court.
The alternative Eleventh Circuit standard that looks at qualification dispar-
ities from the perspective of a “reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial
judgment”136 is facially superior to the one used in Ash.  It is more akin to the
preponderance of the evidence standard properly used in civil trials.  In many
civil cases, courts evaluate the parties’ conduct against that of a reasonable
person.  This standard is more realistic for a plaintiff to satisfy and, although
not exact, is more precise than the standard criticized by the Supreme Court.
However, the Eleventh Circuit has applied it harshly to find that comparative
qualifications, the employer’s use of subjective criteria, and the plaintiff’s
belief that his qualifications were superior are not enough for a factfinder to
Human Res., 152 F. App’x 798, 802 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Templeton v. Bessemer
Water Serv., 154 F. App’x 759, 764 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Cooper v. S. Co., 390
F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004); Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1090 (11th
Cir. 2004); Hall v. Ala. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 326 F.3d 1157, 1167-69 (11th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam); Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1277-78 (11th Cir.
2002); Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam);
Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 2001); Alexander v. Fulton
County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2000); Lee v. GTE Fla., Inc., 226 F.3d 1249,
1254-55 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
131 E.g., Cofield, 267 F.3d at 1269.
132 E.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529, 536 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam);
Lee, 226 F.3d at 1256.
133 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *11-12.
134 See Belton, supra note 70, at 1206-07; Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof:  The Eco-
nomics of Legal Burdens, 1997 BYU L. REV. 1, 3; John M. Monahan, Note, Cabrera v.
Jakabovitz – A Common-Sense Proposal for Formulating Jury Instructions Regarding Shift-
ing Burdens of Proof in Disparate Treatment Discrimination Cases, 5 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L.J. 55, 57 (1994); see also Kellyann Everly, Comment, A Reasonable Burden:  The
Need for a Uniform Burden of Proof Scheme in Reasonable Accommodation Claims, 29 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 37, 38 (2003) (stating that a coherent burden of proof framework is needed
in disability discrimination claims in the reasonable accommodation context).
135 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457-58 (2006) (per curiam).
136 Id. at 457 (citing Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004)).
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find pretext.137  Prior to Ash, the Eleventh Circuit spoke of this standard as
though it was the same as the Ash standard,138 thus making it puzzling that the
court would continue to apply it after the Supreme Court expressed its disap-
proval of the Ash standard.  However, the Eleventh Circuit has used this stan-
dard since the Supreme Court’s decision in Ash139 and ultimately applied it to
Ash on remand.140  The Eleventh Circuit again concluded that the first plaintiff
did not introduce sufficient evidence of pretext to support a verdict in his favor
and further ruled that Tyson was entitled to a new trial as to the second plaintiff
because he did not present enough evidence to support the damages awarded by
the jury.141
The Ninth Circuit standard, that qualifications evidence by itself may
show pretext where the plaintiff’s qualifications are “clearly superior” to those
of the individual selected,142 has many of the same problems as the Ash stan-
dard.  The phrase “clearly superior” is just as vague as the one rejected by the
Supreme Court in Ash.  What is “clearly superior” to one person may appear
only slightly superior to another person, or even equal.  This standard contains
no reference to how a reasonable or impartial person should view the evidence
and could result in courts denying close but potentially meritorious cases a
chance to go before the factfinder.  However, this standard is slightly more
plaintiff-friendly than the one applied in Ash, and unlike the standard used by
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has used it to overturn grants
of summary judgment to employers.143  In the Ninth Circuit, evidence that the
plaintiff and the person actually promoted were equally qualified can be suffi-
cient to withstand a defense motion for summary judgment.144
The D.C. Circuit articulated yet another standard cited in Ash:  A
factfinder may infer pretext if “a reasonable employer would have found the
plaintiff to be significantly better qualified for the job.”145  The main strength
of this standard is that it looks at the facts from the perspective of a reasonable
employer, rather than a reasonable person.  Because the employment decision
affects the employer more than those people unaffiliated with the company, this
137 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 190 F. App’x 924, 927 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
138 Cooper, 390 F.3d at 732.
139 The Eleventh Circuit has applied this standard in multiple cases since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ash.  Higgins v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 196 F. App’x 781, 783 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam); see Ash, 190 F. App’x at 927; Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson
County, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006); Price v. M & H Valve Co., 177 F. App’x 1,
12-13 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Roper v. City of Foley, 177 F. App’x 40, 49 (11th Cir.
2006) (per curiam); Watkins v. Huntsville, 176 F. App’x 955, 956 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
140 Ash, 190 F. App’x at 927.
141 Id.
142 Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 457-58 (2006) (per curiam) (citing Raad v.
Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003)).  The Fifth
Circuit has also used this standard occasionally. See, e.g., EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty.
Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444 (5th Cir. 1995).
143 See, e.g., Margolis v. Tektronix, Inc., 44 F. App’x 138, 141-42 (9th Cir. 2002) (mem.);
Haas v. Betz Labs., Inc., 185 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Godwin
v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998).
144 Margolis, 44 F. App’x at 141-42.
145 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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is a more appropriate perspective for the factfinder to take.  Although the rea-
sonable employer may often have the same perspective as the reasonable per-
son, it may differ in that an employer will have more knowledge about a
particular company’s needs, strengths, and areas needing improvement.
The weakness of the D.C. Circuit’s approach is that it holds employees to
too high a standard of proof, in that they must be “significantly better qualified”
for the position.  The use of the word “significantly” seems to require some-
thing more than a preponderance of the evidence but something less than
beyond a reasonable doubt.  “Significantly” is a vague word, so it is not clear
how much evidence an employee must present.  This standard falls somewhere
in between the virtually impossible to achieve “slap you in the face” standard
used by the Eleventh Circuit in Ash and the more plaintiff-friendly standard
used by the Ninth Circuit.
The previous Supreme Court decisions cited in Ash show that the Court
has required plaintiffs to meet a lesser burden than have the federal appellate
courts.  In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,146 the Court held that a plaintiff
could seek to demonstrate pretext by showing that he or she was better quali-
fied than the individual chosen for the job.147  It does not require qualifications
that are “clearly superior” or “so apparent as virtually to slap you in the face”—
it merely requires qualifications that are “better.”  This is similar to the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard and deserves more deference than it has
received because the Supreme Court articulated this standard.
An alternative standard applied by the Seventh Circuit, not cited in Ash, is
that qualification disparities between different candidates is not evidence of
pretext unless the disparities are “so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be
no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff
was clearly better qualified for the position at issue.”148  However, the Seventh
Circuit has applied this standard to find that even if the comparator evidence
does indicate pretext, it is at best weak evidence of discrimination.149  The
Seventh Circuit has found this approach consistent with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Ash and has applied it since that decision.150  The strength of this
standard is that it specifies that the perspective to be taken is that of a reasona-
ble person of impartial judgment.151  In employment discrimination cases, it
may be difficult to remember that the proper perspective is not that of the
employer in a particular case, but that of an impartial person free from biases
that the employer may or may not have.  The weakness of this standard is that it
requires plaintiffs to satisfy a burden of proof that is far too high.  Language
such as “so favorable” and “clearly better qualified” imply something closer to
the standard of proof used in criminal cases than the standard used in civil
cases.
146 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded on other grounds
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2000)).
147 Id. at 187-88, cited in Ash, 546 U.S. at 457.
148 Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1179 (7th Cir. 2002).
149 Id. at 1183.
150 Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006).
151 Id. at 1059.
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Among the most difficult standards plaintiffs have been required to meet
is that used by the Fifth Circuit.  The Fifth Circuit has required the losing can-
didate in a superior qualifications case to demonstrate that his qualifications
“leap from the record and cry out to all who would listen that he was vastly—
or even clearly—more qualified.”152  This standard is similar to the Ash stan-
dard that the Supreme Court ultimately rejected.  It uses an analogy that brings
a visual image to mind, but is difficult to apply because the significance of the
picture it conjures up in one’s mind will vary from person to person.  The Fifth
Circuit has used this standard to grant summary judgment153 and directed ver-
dicts for employers,154 to reverse trial judge findings of discrimination as being
clearly erroneous,155 and to overturn jury findings of discrimination.156  At
least forty district court decisions in the Fifth Circuit have applied this standard
since 1999, and in all but one case, the judge ruled that the plaintiff’s evidence
was insufficient to satisfy this standard.157  The Sixth Circuit has rejected this
standard due to its “vastly—or even clearly” language, which it could not rec-
oncile with the Supreme Court’s decision in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine.158  In Burdine, the Supreme Court stated that evidence of
qualifications “may be probative of whether the employer’s reasons are pretexts
for discrimination.”159  The Sixth Circuit found the “vastly—or even clearly”
language to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s statement because it
would require the plaintiff to show a “huge disparity in qualifications in order
to provide a genuine issue of fact with regard to pretext.”160  The Sixth Circuit
opined that this directly contradicted the Court’s language in Burdine and was
thus unacceptable.161
The Second and Seventh Circuits have applied a more concrete standard,
but one that is still nearly impossible for plaintiffs to satisfy.162  It requires a
plaintiff to show that her qualifications were so superior to those of the person
selected for the position that no reasonable person using impartial judgment
could have selected the person chosen over the plaintiff.163  This is similar to
the Cooper standard discussed by the Supreme Court in Ash, and shares the
same strengths in that it is more concrete than some other standards and will
therefore facilitate consistent results among different courts.  Its weakness is
that a plaintiff would have difficulty proving that no reasonable person “could”
have selected the person chosen over the plaintiff.  This is closer to the criminal
152 Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).
153 Cook v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs., 108 F. App’x 852, 860-62 (5th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam).
154 Cheney v. U.S. Oncology, Inc., 34 F. App’x 962 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
155 Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 847 (5th Cir. 1993).
156 Scott v. Univ. of Miss., 148 F.3d 493, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1998); EEOC v. La. Office of
Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1445 (5th Cir. 1995).
157 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 85, at *15.
158 Bender v. Hecht’s Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 626 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Tex. Dep’t of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)).
159 Id. at 626 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259).
160 Jenkins v. Nashville Pub. Radio, 106 F. App’x 991, 994-95 (6th Cir. 2004).
161 Id.
162 Jordan v. City of Gary, 396 F.3d 825, 834 (7th Cir. 2005); Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell,
Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2001).
163 Jordan, 396 F.3d at 834; Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 103.
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standard of beyond a reasonable doubt because it implies that if there is even a
mere possibility that the employer could have legitimately chosen the candidate
selected over the plaintiff, the employer must win.  Very few plaintiffs would
be able to satisfy this overly demanding standard.
None of the standards currently in use in the federal courts adequately
serve the needs of both employers and employees.  Accordingly, a new stan-
dard is needed that will be fair to parties on both sides of employment discrimi-
nation disputes.
C. A New Standard
The burden of proof concept is one of the most important procedural
aspects of the judicial system.164  It assists factfinders in their application of
substantive law by quantifying what level of confidence they should have in
making conclusions of fact in a particular case.165  The allocation of the burden
of proof is often the dispositive factor in the outcome of the proceedings.166
The different standards currently used by the federal courts each have their
own strengths and weaknesses.  By combining parts of the different approaches
mentioned in Ash, one can formulate a superior standard for use by the courts.
The standard would be articulated as follows:  A factfinder may infer pretext if
a reasonable employer exercising impartial judgment would more likely than
not have chosen the plaintiff over the candidate actually selected absent a dis-
criminatory motive.  This would combine the approach taken by the D.C. Cir-
cuit, the alternative Eleventh Circuit standard cited by the Supreme Court, and
the Seventh Circuit standard.
This approach has the strength of viewing a situation from the perspective
of the reasonable employer—a perspective that is more relevant than that of a
reasonable person.  Some courts have already used the reasonable employer
standard in cases involving constructive discharge,167 harassment,168 employer
intrusions on employee privacy,169 and retaliation.170  The factfinder should
look at the facts from the perspective of a reasonable employer in the defen-
dant’s particular line of business because different types of businesses will have
different legitimate priorities regarding the qualifications of employees they
seek to hire and promote.171
164 Belton, supra note 70, at 1207.
165 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970).
166 Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 585 (1976).
167 McPherson v. City of Waukegan, 379 F.3d 430, 441 (7th Cir. 2004); Tiner v. Greenberg,
Traurig, P.A., 50 F. App’x 859, 860 (9th Cir. 2002) (mem.); Banks v. Ohio, 50 F.3d 10 (6th
Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
168 Erickson v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., 469 F.3d 600, 605-06 (7th Cir. 2006); Kunin v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 175 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1999); Risinger v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’
Comp., 883 F.2d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 1989).
169 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
170 Carter v. George Wash. Univ., 387 F.3d 872, 881-82 (D.C. Cir. 2004); David v. Cater-
pillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 861-62 (7th Cir. 2003).
171 See William M. Muth, Jr., Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII
Cases and the Challenge Presented by Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174
(11th Cir. 1992), 72 NEB. L. REV. 330, 347 (1993).
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This approach would allow a factfinder to infer pretext but would not
require such an inference to be drawn, as evidenced by the word may.  This
approach would take the perspective of a reasonable employer with impartial
judgment, meaning a reasonable employer free from biases against members of
a protected group.  Although it may seem obvious that the perspective taken
should be that of a person free from biases, the standard needs to be explicit in
this regard because, in some industries more so than others, a typical employer
may have strong biases that have historically been accepted against a protected
group.  For example, transportation, storage and warehousing, and manufactur-
ing industries have a high rate of discrimination against women and minori-
ties.172  This might mean that a typical employer in these industries is likely to
discriminate, albeit perhaps subconsciously.173  Thus, it is important that there
be a distinction between a reasonable employer and a typical employer
because, unfortunately, these are not one and the same.
The evidentiary burden here would be more likely than not.  This burden
is lighter than any of the approaches discussed by the Supreme Court in Ash.
This lighter burden has the advantage of keeping potentially meritorious cases
before the courts that otherwise might be wrongfully dismissed if an errone-
ously high evidentiary burden is required.  One must remember that despite the
often atrocious facts that underlie an employment discrimination claim, it is
still a civil matter, not criminal, and so the standard that applies in other civil
cases applies in employment discrimination disputes as well.
The more likely than not burden is the one imposed on plaintiffs seeking
to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.174  In
a more recent decision, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may obtain a
mixed-motive jury instruction if she presents evidence that would allow a rea-
sonable jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that a discriminatory
factor was one of the motivating factors in an employment decision.175  This
indicates that the more likely than not standard is appropriate in a wide variety
of employment discrimination situations.  The proposed standard is also consis-
tent with Congress’s intent.  Congress has been clear whenever it has chosen to
require heightened proof requirements in other contexts, and it has not chosen
to include a higher burden on employee plaintiffs in the statute at this time.176
Because an employer’s intent is nearly always in dispute in an employ-
ment discrimination case,177 courts should not easily dismiss such cases before
they reach the factfinder, and once the factfinder has made a decision, courts
should give this decision its proper weight and not overturn it lightly.  Employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs already face serious challenges because direct
172 Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, First Statistical Report on Intentional Job
Discrimination Against Women, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 63, 101-06 (2003).
173 Id.
174 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
175 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
176 Kerry S. Acocella, Note, Out with the Old and in with the New:  The Second Circuit
Shows It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Finally Overrule McDonnell Douglas, 11 CAR-
DOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 125, 137-38 (2004) (citing Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 99).
177 Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co, 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
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evidence of discrimination is difficult to obtain.178  Indeed, the Supreme Court
appears to have taken notice of this problem and over the last several years has
chosen to remove the artificial legal doctrines used by the federal courts to
reduce their civil rights caseloads via disposal through summary judgment.179
Because this proposed standard is more plaintiff-friendly than any of those
the Supreme Court mentioned in Ash, employers would likely criticize it as
more cases would proceed to trial under this standard.  Placing a lesser burden
on employee plaintiffs may result in employers paying more money to preserve
records for litigation and give employees—particularly those in management—
more anti-discrimination training.180  However, employers are already respon-
sible for bearing the costs of anti-discrimination training,181 and these increased
costs will balance out as discrimination within a company becomes less com-
mon, thus leading to fewer incidents of discrimination for which the company
would be liable.182
D. The Need for a More Plaintiff-Friendly Standard
Too many courts hold plaintiffs to a standard of proof that requires them
to eliminate all of their employer’s potential nondiscriminatory reasons for an
employment decision, rather than requiring them to establish discrimination as
the cause of the decision by a preponderance of the evidence.183  Courts subject
plaintiffs to these difficult standards because of a belief that judges are not as
knowledgeable about job qualifications as are those who have training and
experience in a particular field.184  Accordingly, they conclude that judges
should be hesitant to substitute their own opinions for those of the individuals
making the promotion decisions who have experience working in the particular
area in question.185  Indeed, multiple courts have stated that courts should not
function as “super personnel department[s],”186 but rather, should take care to
178 Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000))).
179 Richard T. Seymour, Evidence in Employment Cases, 2006 A.L.I.–A.B.A. CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION 471, 497.
180 Jarrett Haskovec, Note, A Beast of Burden?  The New EU Burden-of-Proof Arrangement
in Cases of Employment Discrimination Compared to Existing U.S. Law, 14 TRANSNAT’L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1069, 1103 (2005).
181 United States v. N. L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 366 n.11 (8th Cir. 1973).
182 R. Bales, Libertarianism, Environmentalism, and Utilitarianism:  An Examination of
Theoretical Frameworks for Enforcing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1993
DETROIT C.L. REV. 1163, 1198; Glenn Kramer, Note, Reasonableness for Free:  Why Buy
Employment Practices Liability Insurance When EEOC.gov Gives Protection Away?, 3 CAR-
DOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 459, 470 (2005).
183 See Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style:  Case Studies in
the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 27 (2005).
184 Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 847 (5th Cir. 1993).
185 Id.
186 E.g., Bender v. Hecht’s Dep’t Stores, 455 F.3d 612, 627 (6th Cir. 2006); Mlynczak v.
Bodman, 442 F.3d 1050, 1060 (7th Cir. 2006); Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d
1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 730 (11th Cir.
2004); Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 74 (1st Cir. 2004); Newsom-Lang v. Warren
Int’l, Inc., 80 F. App’x 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2003).
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ensure that they remain in their “proper role of preventing unlawful employ-
ment practices.”187
Inquiring into whether an employer’s reason for making a particular
employment decision was discriminatory or not is “both sensitive and difficult”
because it involves an inquiry into the employer’s state of mind.188  Those
responsible for making promotion decisions may feel no incentive to base their
decisions on nondiscriminatory factors because they are already in a dominant
and prosperous position within the company and may not want to chance stir-
ring things up by promoting someone they perceive as being different, which
could make a change in the power structure more likely.189  Some have argued
that employers will see increased productivity by keeping their group of
employees homogenous.190  However, the limited evidence that allegedly sup-
ports this theory is mixed, and the general conclusion is that while homogeneity
in the workplace may enhance employee satisfaction and productivity, it also
harms the employer by limiting ideas and creativity within the company.191
The United States has traditionally been more reluctant to intrude into
employer-employee relationships than have other countries, perhaps because of
the American emphasis on a deregulated economy and capitalism, as well as
the importance of the employment at-will doctrine.192  Countries in the Euro-
pean Union shift the burden of persuasion in employment discrimination cases
to the employer once the employee establishes a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.193  France has even made racial discrimination in employment decisions a
criminal offense.194  While this Note is not suggesting that the United States
should follow suit and impose criminal penalties in employment discrimination
cases, it is important to recognize that America is not in accord with most other
industrialized nations with respect to its anti-discrimination policies and laws.
Furthermore, employment discrimination defendants who appeal a district court
decision achieve a far higher rate of reversal than do plaintiffs in these cases.195
This discrepancy exists at the pretrial stage (forty-two percent to eleven per-
cent) and becomes even more disparate for appeals after the trial stage (forty-
two percent to seven percent).196  While this “anti-plaintiff effect” exists in
most categories of cases (thirty-three percent to twelve percent), it is the most
187 Bender, 455 F.3d at 627.
188 U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
189 See Selmi, supra note 183, at 41.
190 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race The-
ory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (book review).
191 Frances J. Milliken & Luis L. Martins, Searching for Common Threads:  Understanding
the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups, 21 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 402, 403
(1996).
192 Haskovec, supra note 180, at 1093-94.
193 Id. at 1090.
194 Donna M. Gitter, Comment, French Criminalization of Racial Employment Discrimina-
tion Compared to the Imposition of Civil Penalties in the United States, 15 COMP. LAB. L.J.
488, 489 (1994).
195 Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart S. Schwab, How Employment-Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
547, 551-52 (2003).
196 Id. at 552.
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pronounced in employment discrimination cases.197  This is troubling consider-
ing the fact that witness credibility is more critical in employment discrimina-
tion cases than in many other types of civil cases because the focus of the
dispute is based on the thought processes of the employer’s decisionmaker.
This should make reversals in such disputes rare.  However, reversals appear to
be rare only in employer victories, and the disparity exists in every circuit.198
The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]here there are two permissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly errone-
ous.”199  It is well established that jury verdicts should be upheld unless they
are against the great weight of the evidence,200 that a trial judge’s conclusion
that a jury verdict is not against the weight of the evidence is subject to review
under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard,201 and that questions
of fact in bench trials are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.202
However, the statistics reveal that appellate courts are not following these rules
when reviewing decisions in employment discrimination cases.
The danger in applying such difficult standards is that they are all but
impossible for a plaintiff to satisfy, thus sending a message to employers that
they can discriminate without fear of legal repercussions.  Some have justified
the high burden on employee plaintiffs by claiming that without it, there would
be a substantial increase in frivolous litigation from disgruntled employees.203
There is evidence that the opposite may be true, however, as the increased use
of summary judgment to dispose of claims may actually discourage parties
from engaging in settlement negotiations, the most efficient manner of lighten-
ing court caseloads.204
Additionally, when employers know they are unlikely to face liability if an
employee brings suit, they will lack any incentive to keep thorough records
regarding employment decisions or to give their employees anti-discrimination
training.205  Conversely, when employers view legal liability as a serious
threat, they are more likely to give their employees diversity training—in fact,
197 Id. at 554-55.
198 Id. at 555.
199 Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985); see also Inwood Labs.,
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S.
338, 342 (1949).
200 E.g., Brown v. Parker Drilling Offshore Corp., 444 F.3d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam); United States v. Hynes, 467 F.3d 951, 956 (6th Cir. 2006); Mems v. City of St.
Paul, Dep’t of Fire & Safety Servs., 327 F.3d 771, 786 (8th Cir. 2003).
201 E.g., Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001); Butler v. French,
83 F.3d 942, 944-45 (8th Cir. 1996); Tragarz v. Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411, 430 (7th Cir.
1992); McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (10th Cir. 1988).
202 E.g., Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573; Eyler v. Comm’r, 88 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 1996).
203 See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch & David J. Barrans, The Analysis and
Decision of Summary Judgment Motions:  A Monograph on Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 139 F.R.D. 441, 450-51 (1992); Bena Varughese, Opoku-Acheampong v.
Depository Trust Co., 19 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 187, 192 (2006).
204 Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judg-
ment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 75 (1990).
205 See Haskovec, supra note 180, at 1098.
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the threat of litigation is the most common reason for diversity training.206
Another justification used by some courts is that if the standard plaintiffs were
required to satisfy was too low, employers would be afraid to make the decision
that truly serves their best interests out of fear of liability.207  If employers truly
base their decisions on their best interests and not on discriminatory reasons,
however, they will have little difficulty proving that their reasons for making a
promotion decision were legitimate.208
The legal rights involved in an employment discrimination case are only a
small part of what is at stake.  In our modern, achievement-oriented society,
one’s sense of self-worth often relates closely to one’s job.209  When individu-
als perceive their employers have discriminated against them, they suffer
adverse psychological effects including anger, abandonment, helplessness,
paranoia, betrayal, and depression.210  Research shows that victims of discrimi-
nation not only care about whether the law will give them the results they seek,
but also whether the legal procedures in place feel just and fair.211  Because of
the enormous financial and psychological consequences of employment dis-
crimination, it is critical that employers have an incentive to eliminate the dis-
crimination that remains prevalent in the workplace, despite the laws designed
to eradicate it.
V. CONCLUSION
A standard that is fair to employee plaintiffs is critical because, while
employees’ rights have come a long way since the passage of Title VII, the
federal courts continue to erect significant barriers for employee plaintiffs to
overcome in the form of overly burdensome burdens of proof.  Society has an
interest in promoting better workplace service and production through discrimi-
nation free employment decisions by eliminating, or at least reducing, the
remains of this country’s history of discrimination.  Because employment dis-
crimination is still so common, employers are likely viewing the benefits of
discrimination as outweighing the costs; otherwise, economic reasons would
force them to stop.  This could be due to a lack of severe penalties.  It could
also be due to employer beliefs that even if their employees sue them for
engaging in unlawful discrimination, they will escape liability because the evi-
206 Katrina Jordan, Diversity Training in the Workplace Today:  A Status Report, 58 J.
CAREER PLAN. & EMP. 46, 51 (1998).
207 See David M. Young, Note, The Ninth Circuit Requires Alaskan Employers to Prove
Misconduct to Justify Termination of Employees in Hazardous Workplaces:  Sanders v.
Parker Drilling, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 201, 227 (1991).
208 See, e.g., Rosanna K. McCalips, Comment, What Recent Court Cases Indicate About
English-Only Rules in the Workplace:  A Critical Look at the Need for a Supreme Court
Ruling on the Issue, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 417, 422 (2002).
209 Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimi-
nation Laws:  A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1474 (2004).
210 Id. at 1474-75 (citing Edward Dunbar, Counseling Practices to Ameliorate the Effects of
Discrimination and Hate Events:  Toward a Systematic Approach to Assessment and Inter-
vention, 29 COUNSELING PSYCHOLOGIST 279, 281 (2001)).
211 Id. at 1483-84.
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dentiary standard that the courts will require of employees is too high for a
plaintiff to succeed.
The legal system must do something to send a message to employers that
it will no longer tolerate employment discrimination.  One way to do this would
be to make the evidentiary hurdle easier for plaintiffs to clear so that their
claims can progress further into the justice system, thus warning employers that
they cannot escape liability for discrimination and forcing them to make serious
changes in their employment practices.  If the government is to eliminate or
seriously reduce employment discrimination on a national level, the federal
courts must form a coherent burden of proof standard that explains how to
evaluate evidence based on common experience so that factfinders can better
understand the standard and apply it in a manner that is fair to both employers
and employees.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\8-1\NVJ119.txt unknown Seq: 25 17-JAN-08 10:28
